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Snoeck Henkemans has given us a welcome treatment of hyperbole that situates it
within the field of argumentation. We have been taught, perhaps most pointedly by
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) and Fahnestock (1999), that figurative
language has an argumentative nature. To move beyond generalizations as
amorphous as that one, however, we need to have detailed analyses of specific
tropes. Snoeck Henkemans is engaged in such a project, having previously studied
rhetorical questions, praeteritio, and metonymy for us. She has now expertly added
hyperbole to the list of tropes to be analyzed for their argumentative character.
For this sort of work, the central issue in our community is presently
captured by the phrase ‘strategic maneuvering.’ This refers to the process by which
people move rhetorically through a discourse space that might otherwise be
described only dialectically (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999). Strategic
maneuvering is a fairly clear and uncontroversial idea for some members of our
community (those hailing from rhetoric and communication) but is a little delicate
for others (the informal logicians and other philosophers). The reason for this mild
difference in perspective is that the rhetoricians see a critical discussion as an
exhibition of rhetorical action that might be disciplined by dialectical norms,
whereas the philosophers see the same exchange as a dialogue whose nature is
sometimes obscured by unnecessarily imprecise or otherwise objectionable
phrasing. We all see the same things going on, but groups of us are trained to see
different things first and essentially.
Rhetorical and dialectical action have a means-end relationship. For a very
few people, awkwardly including many in this room, the primary motive for
entering into a critical discussion might be to find out the truth. For most people,
however, the controlling motive would be rhetorical: to prevail or dominate. To see
how few people argue to seek truth, try wandering through a shopping mall,
approaching strangers, and saying, “I’m having trouble deciding which is more
important, truth or justice. Will you help me figure it out?” See how many takers you
get. van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999, p. 481) understood clearly which was the
means and which the end, in their early explanation of strategic maneuvering:
The balancing of a resolution-minded dialectical objective with the rhetorical
objective of having one’s own position accepted is occasion for strategic
manoeuvring in which the parties seek to meet their dialectical obligations without
sacrificing their rhetorical aims.
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-3.
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In this phrasing, I believe that van Eemeren and Houtlosser are acknowledging that
people argue order to pursue their personal aims (not their epistemological ones)
and that dialectical discipline is accepted so long as it does not endanger rhetorical
aims. In other words, dialectical action is a means to the achievement of a rhetorical
goal.
Our problem, summed up in the phrase strategic maneuvering, is that
dialectical action is not the only possible means. Threats, violence, bribery, sexual
blackmail, lying – these could bring home forced cooperation or some other
personal objective. Notice that all these things can be done with words. All of them
could appear in a face-to-face disagreement. Our community’s problem is to figure
out when various maneuvers are tolerable and when they must be rejected as
fallacies and derailments.
Finally, this brings me back to hyperbole. Snoeck Henkemans gives us a
number of examples in which the hyperbole was expressive and not obscuring,
charming and not unfair, emphatic and not threatening. But she also gives us other
instances in which the hyperbole tried to move the burden of proof unfairly or made
an emotionally forceful claim that could not be traced down to a proposition to
which the speaker was committed. The linguistic form is neither guilty nor innocent
by itself. Snoeck Henkemans insists therefore on the importance of context in
interpreting hyperbole. I think that she means semantic or topical context in these
remarks.
I was struck by a different clue in Snoeck Henkemans’ paper. Her first
sentence defines hyperbole as “a rhetorical trope by means of which statements are
made that are obviously exaggerated and thus untrue or unwarranted.” Most of her
paper is about the idea of exaggeration. I’d like to take a moment to think about
“obviously.” Obvious to whom? It could be the speaker, the hearer, or the external
analyst, but I think the real answer is that ‘hyperbole’s exaggeration is obvious to
anyone who actually understands the hyperbole.’ Some people may not understand
hyperbole very well because they don’t work well with figurative language (e.g.,
Douglas & Peel 1979), and some may be uncertain about a particular example. I
myself wasn’t sure whether Snoeck Henkeman’s 6th example (the one that claimed
“hundreds of thousands of people can confirm this”) was a literal claim or not. We
can all see that when something is intended as hyperbole but isn’t understood as
such, trouble is brewing, and the same can be said when a statement is intended
literally but is treated as an exaggeration. Confusions and derailments, at least
temporary ones, are likely in these circumstances because of a failure in
obviousness.
But what happens when the hyperbole is obvious, when everyone
understands what is happening? Is derailment possible then? I am not sure it is, at
least for people who are participating dialectically. If I say at dinner tonight,
“Michael Gilbert is the prince of philosophy, the duke of dialectic, and the great lord
of logic,” I doubt that any of you would be taken in by my apparent claims of his
royal heritage. These descriptions are so obviously exaggerated that you would tone
them down to a plausible expression of my appreciation for his work. You would
hold me responsible for defending that judgment if necessary, and I would be
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committed to do so – just as pragma-dialectical norms would wish. Even if there
were some momentary confusion about how literal I was being – maybe you think
Michael Gilbert bears some resemblance to the English royal family – we could
quickly clarify things. But as I quietly specified, this is only the case “for people who
are participating dialectically.”
Sometimes people only participate rhetorically, without any dialectical
interests. They take cheap shots, they make accusations that are so odd that they are
difficult to disprove, they leap toward slippery slopes, and they use hyperbole to get
on the evening news. Thus Snoeck Henkemans’ 7th example when one televised
politician insists that “nobody” believes his opponent and “everyone” knows his
leadership is flawed. Remember that we have seen that dialectical action is only a
means to rhetorical aims, and is not even the only means. Sometimes people use the
appearance of reasoned exchanges as no more than a cover, just as a little girl might
put on her mother’s dress so she can pretend to be grown up. There is no derailment
here because there was no dialectical engagement in the first place. Obviousness
doesn’t help because simply pointing out the exaggeration doesn’t get the statement
discarded or rephrased, as ought to happen in a critical discussion.
I am not sure how far to press this reasoning. Is obviousness always a
protection against derailment for people who are dialectically engaged? I am a little
worried that obviousness might be smuggling in the idea of perfect mutual
understanding, which isn’t very realistic. On the other hand, if a hyperbole is
obvious it seems as though it can be set aside just as easily as a little jest between
friends, with no damage at all to the character of their joint reasoning. In any event, I
think we should contemplate “obviously” just as carefully as “exaggerated” in
thinking about hyperbole.
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